SEASONAL OLIGOPOLY POWER IN THE D'ANJOU PEAR INDUSTRY by Winfree, Jason A. et al.
56   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
Seasonal Oligopoly Power in the D’Anjou Pear Industry
Jason A. Winfree, Jill J. McCluskey, Ron C. Mittelhammer, and Paula Gutman
We estimate seasonal oligopoly power at a disaggregated variety level in the D’Anjou pear market. Our data spans 
1993 to 2000, during which time imported pears became more prevalent in the U.S. market. The range of monthly in-
dustry-conduct-parameter magnitudes is 0.034 to 0.195 and is most pronounced when the fresh D’Anjou pear crop ﬁrst 
becomes available in the earliest months of the marketing year. Possible reasons for timing of oligopoly power relate 
to the growth of imported pears during the latter portion of marketing year. In addition, oligopoly power may diminish 
during the marketing year as pears in storage decline in quality.
Although agents in the agricultural marketing chain 
are often assumed to be price takers, there are some 
sectors that exhibit high levels of concentration. 
Supply and competition are more likely to vary 
during the course of a year in agricultural indus-
tries than in other industries because of biological 
and weather constraints. This seasonality may 
be mitigated by new developments in chemicals, 
transportation, and shipping that allow imports to 
compete more than in the past--for example, fruit 
from Latin America can supply off-season fruit to 
the United States. In this paper, we study seasonal 
oligopoly power in the D’Anjou pear market.
Although the market for growing D’Anjou pears 
appears to be competitive, opportunities may exist 
for cooperative behavior by pear packers. Oligopoly 
power in the D’Anjou pear market would create 
consumer-welfare losses, possibly prompting mar-
ket regulators to step in. The existence of oligopoly 
power may also alert pear growers that it may be 
proﬁtable to vertically integrate into the packing 
market if feasible. Price mark-ups may also affect 
the quantity of imported fruits or other fruits such as 
apples or oranges.
The seasonality of supply makes the pear market 
interesting from an industrial-organization perspec-
tive. Even so, few researchers have studied oligopoly 
power in the pear industry, and to our knowledge 
no researchers have studied this issue at the disag-
gregated variety level. In their study of seasonal 
oligopoly power, Arnade and Pick (2000) found 
modest levels of oligopoly power in the aggregate 
U.S. pear market. Estimates from Wann and Sexton’s 
(1992) multiple-product framework suggested lim-
ited oligopoly power in pear processing (θ = 0.08) 
but greater power in the fruit cocktail market (θ = 
0.48). Hypotheses of perfect competition and pure 
monopsony in pear procurement were both rejected. 
Our study of the pear market focuses on a particular 
variety of pear--D’Anjous--and thus mitigates the 
potential problem of concluding that little or no 
oligopoly power exists because of the confound-
ing of market forces across various pear types with 
differing marketing seasons and market advantages. 
D’Anjous have different coloration, shape, and taste 
from other types of pears; they are not only seasonally 
differentiated, but are also differentiated with respect 
to usage. Moreover, our study is based on recent data 
that spans the latter part of the 1990s to the year 2000, 
during which time imported pears became much more 
prevalent in the U.S. market, and therefore has the 
potential for demonstrably effecting oligopoly power 
in pear markets. 
Beyond Arnade and Pick (2000), only a few 
researchers have studied seasonal market industry 
conduct. MacDonald (2000) studied seasonal de-
mand and competition for different seasonal food 
products using electronic scanner data. He found 
that prices fell during demand peaks, which may 
have been due to advertising effects. DeVoretz and 
Salvanes (1993) found the possibility of seasonal 
oligopoly power in the salmon industry. Using data 
from 1983 to 1988 they concluded that this was 
due to more inelastic demand during certain times 
of the year.
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More generally, empirical industrial-organiza-
tion economists have long been concerned with 
measuring the degree of competition in markets. 
The measurement of departures from marginal-
cost pricing lies at the core of these studies, with 
important ramiﬁcations for consumer welfare, ﬁrm 
proﬁts, and efﬁciency of the market. While prod-
uct prices are readily observable, marginal cost 
is difﬁcult to observe directly, necessitating the 
inference of ﬁrm conduct through “conjectures” 
of ﬁrms. This approach has become known as the 
“New Empirical Industrial Organization” (Bresna-
han 1989). Early examples of this approach include 
Appelbaum (1979, 1982), Gollop and Roberts (1979), 
and Roberts (1984). 
Two dominant modeling approaches exist for 
estimating oligopoly power. Studies estimating 
oligopoly power using single-demand equations, 
or systems of demand or inverse-demand equations, 
include Beutel and McBride (1992) and Hall (1988). 
These models frequently draw criticism because 
they can generate inconsistent or biased parameter 
estimates insofar as specification may include 
right-hand-side quantity or price variables that are 
also functions of unspeciﬁed endogenous-supply 
behavior. The second principal modeling approach 
employs a system of supply and demand equations 
to estimate the Lerner index (1934). Studies using 
this methodology include Schroeter (1988) and 
Porter (1983), and as with any system of equations 
the parameter estimates are sensitive to model speci-
ﬁcation. In short, neither the single equation nor the 
systems-of-equations method is without difﬁculties 
in terms of empirical implementation. 
Speciﬁc examples of problems that arise with 
single-equation approaches include Hall’s method 
that relies on the assumption of constant returns-
to-scale (CRS) technology. A Monte Carlo study 
by Hyde and Perloff (1994) showed that deviations 
from the assumption of CRS result in a biased es-
timate of the degree of oligopoly power. In Beutel 
and McBride’s single-equation demand-function 
estimation, where the mark-up over marginal cost 
was recovered, they showed that in regressing price 
on quantity the possible endogeneity of quantity was 
not addressed. With respect to econometric prob-
lems involving the systems-of-equations approach, 
Hyde and Perloff demonstrated that misspecifying 
the production function results in biased parameter 
estimates of the degree of monopsony power.
This paper estimates supply and demand equa-
tions, so results are consistent to the extent that the 
model speciﬁcation is correct. The Lerner estimates 
are then calculated for a measure of oligopoly pow-
er. However, because a number of input prices were 
not included, we are unable to also jointly estimate 
a system of input demands, and because reduced-
form parameters were used, we are also unable to 
utilize cross-equation restrictions. For both of these 
reasons, opportunities for obtaining more-efﬁcient 
elasticity estimates were not available.
The D’Anjou Pear Market
For certain agricultural industries, sales desks/
packers have the potential to exert oligopoly power. 
In the Northwest D’Anjou pear industry, there are 
approximately 1700 growers throughout Washing-
ton and Oregon, but over eighty percent of the sales 
and marketing of pears is handled by less than ten 
sales desks/packers.1 Larger produce-supply ﬁrms 
have advantages in their vertical relationships with 
major food retailers. Some major food retailers are 
doing business with fewer but larger produce suppli-
ers who can better meet their increasingly complex 
requirements, such as electronic data interchange 
(EDI) and special packaging requirements (Patter-
son and Richards 2000; McCluskey and O’Rourke 
2000).
The United States is second to China in total 
pear production (O’Rourke 1998). There are two 
types of seasonal American pears: summer and 
winter pears. Most U.S. pear production occurs is 
just three Western states: California, Oregon, and 
Washington. Bartlett is the major summer variety 
and is primarily sold for processing. D’Anjou is the 
major winter variety; it is sold primarily in the fresh 
market. Almost all of the D’Anjous are grown in the 
Western states, primarily Washington and Oregon 
(Gao and O’Rourke, 1992). Pears are the second 
most important deciduous fruit (after apples) in 
terms of gross revenues in the Paciﬁc Northwest.
D’Anjou pears are typically fully harvested 
by late September. These pears are then sorted by 
grade and size, boxed, and placed in either regular 
or controlled-atmosphere storage by the packers 
who receive them in bulk (Gutman, Mittelham-
mer, and Schotzko 2002). The pears are marketed 
  1 The packers do not actually buy the pears from 
the growers. Rather, they provide marketing services, so 
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throughout the year, with the exception of August, 
due to storage limitations. Historically, D’Anjous 
enter the market in the early fall at the same time 
that Bartletts from California are nearing the end of 
their marketing season, and D’Anjous are thought 
to face signiﬁcant competition from imported fresh 
pears from South America beginning in February 
or March. Bosc pears appear in the market with 
D’Anjous throughout the entire D’Anjou market-
ing year (Gutman, Mittelhammer, and Schotzko 
2002). 
The Northwest D’Anjou pear market is char-
acterized by seasonality and supplied by different 
sources during different seasons, so it appears 
quite possible that seasonal trends in conduct ex-
ist in the industry. Industry behavior might also 
change over time due to new storage methods that 
affect the produce industry (Gutman, Mittelham-
mer, and Schotzko 2002). Estimating oligopoly 
power using annual data may therefore generate 
results that suggest a competitive market when, 
in fact, seasonally varying oligopoly power may 
exist (Arnade and Pick 2000). For example, ad-
ditional oligopoly power may result when only a 
few producers have remaining D’Anjou pear stocks 
during the May-through-July marketing period, and 
oligopoly power may wane when fresh pears from 
Latin America become available in the spring and 
early summer months. 
The pear market, like most other produce mar-
kets, has become increasingly global in recent 
years. Imports from Latin American producers have 
increased; in particular, shipments of imported pears 
were typically between 2.8 and 3.8 million boxes 
annually, but beginning in crop year 1997 (deﬁned 
as September 1997 through July 1998) about 5.7 
million boxes were imported to the United States. 
For crop years 1998 and 1999, shipments were 5.3 
million boxes and 5 million boxes, respectively. 
This can be compared to the approximately 11 mil-
lion boxes of D’Anjous shipped domestically each 
year. Major alternative pear varieties that have the 
potential to compete with D’Anjous are primarily 
imported pears from Latin America and Bartletts 
and Boscs from Washington and California. Possible 
alternative substitute fruit varieties include oranges, 
whose price Arnade and Pick (2000) included in 
their demand model for pears (despite its statistical 
insigniﬁcance in their analysis) and apples, which 
we investigate in our empirical analysis.
Testing the Degree of Oligopoly Power
The principal hypothesis examined in this paper is 
that Northwest packers and sales desks exercise sea-
sonal oligopoly power in the D’Anjou pear industry, 
allowing the Northwest D’Anjou pear industry to 
achieve positive incremental economic proﬁts. In 
order to study the seasonal oligopoly power in this 
industry, an industry conduct parameter, θ, is al-
lowed to vary on a monthly basis. For a given time 
period this parameter is deﬁned as 
(1)     MC = P(1 + θ/ξ)
where MC is marginal cost, p is price, ξ is price 
elasticity of demand, θ ∈ [0, 1] represents an index 
of oligopoly power, and - θ/ξ is the Lerner index. Per-
fectly competitive behavior is denoted by θ = 0, and 
θ = 1 denotes monopoly or perfect collusion. Various 
types of oligopoly behavior are represented by values 
of θ between these polar cases, with higher values of θ 
implying more signiﬁcant divergences from competi-
tive behavior. By allowing θ to vary monthly, we can 
test for varying levels of market behavior throughout 
the marketing year. For the purposes of estimating 
oligopoly power in the Northwest pear industry, an 
equilibrium model of supply and demand over crop 
years is estimated and analyzed.
Model Speciﬁcation
The model is designed to estimate the index of 
oligopoly power, θ, derived from equation (1), 
as suggested by Porter. In specifying the model 
it is assumed that ﬁrms seek to maximize proﬁts. 
It follows that the ﬁrst-order condition character-
izing the optimal supply of size i pears in month t 
is given by
(2)    Pit = (1 + θit/ξit) = MCit
where Pit is the sales desk/packer price for D’Anjous 
of size i and month t, ξit is the price elasticity of 
demand, and MCit is marginal cost. 
 
Supply
Generalizing the speciﬁcation of Porter to allow for 
the effects of a vector of cost-function shifters, Zit, 
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(3)    C(qit) = csqit
τs f (Zs
it) + F,
where C(•) is the industry cost function, qit is 
quantity, f(•) denotes a function of cost shifters, 
F denotes ﬁxed cost, and cs and τs are parameters 
of the cost function with the former denoting the 
cost-function intercept and the latter denoting the 
elasticity of variable cost with respect to output. 
The marginal cost function can be deﬁned via dif-
ferentiation to be
(4)    MC(qit) = csτsqit
τs -1f (Zs
it).
We note that in specifying the cost and marginal 
cost functions for the D’Anjou pear industry, it is 
assumed that costs are being modeled for the entire 
wholesaling operation, which is considered to be a 
combination of grower and packer operations. This 
assumption is justiﬁed because packinghouses are 
often owned by consortiums of growers. Appel-
baum (1982) demonstrated that if producers use 
the same technology and face similar input prices, 
an aggregate marginal cost function exists. These 
conditions can be reasonably assumed to hold in the 
D’Anjou pear industry. The industry cost function 
then represents the amalgamated costs for both the 
producers and packers, and both production and 
marketing costs are being modeled. 
Upon combining equations (2) and (4), and tak-
ing logarithms of both sides of equation (2), the 
inverse industry-supply function can be expressed 
as
(5)    ln(pit) = δs + (τs − 1)ln(qit) + ln(f (Zs
it)) −
        ln(1 + θit/ξit),
where δs = ln(csτs). We note that when θit ≠ 0, equa-
tion (5) might be better referred to as a supply 
relationship than a supply equation per se, given 
that when oligopoly power exists, in effect price is 
higher than marginal cost, and it is this effect that 




Regarding the speciﬁcation of D’Anjou pear de-
mand, we follow Porter and specify demand in 
terms of a loglinear function of price, as
(6)    qit = Di(pit) = cdpit
τd g (Zd
it),
where Di(•) is the market-demand function for pears 
of size I; g(•) denotes a function of the vector of 
demand shifters, Zd
it; and cd and τd are parameters 
of the demand function with the former denoting 
the demand function intercept and the latter denot-
ing the elasticity of demand with respect to price. 
Taking logarithms, the speciﬁcation of the demand 
function becomes
(7)    ln(qit) = δd + τd ln(pit) + ln(g (Zd
it)),
where δd = ln(cd). 
Given the preceding deﬁnition of the demand 
function, it follows that the trailing term in equa-
tion (5) relating to the oligopoly-power index is 
representable as (1 + θit/τd), so that in effect the 
demand and supply models share the parameter τd. 
In the next section we discuss the data available to 
estimate the demand and supply functions, and we 
specify the empirical counterparts of equations (5) 
and (7) that are used to generate empirical estimates 
of the seasonally varying oligopoly-power index.
Data and Empirical Model
Most industry oligopoly-power studies use annual 
data. In order to obtain sufﬁcient observations, these 
applications may include thirty or more years of in-
dustry data, during which time signiﬁcant technical 
and/or structural changes may have occurred. This 
study uses monthly data covering the crop years 
(September through July) 1993–1994 through 
1999–2000. The use of monthly data allows an in-
vestigation of seasonality in oligopoly power. The 
Paciﬁc Northwest Pear Bureau provided most of the 
data used in this statistical analysis. These data con-
sisted of observations on D’Anjou pear transactions 
at the shipper’s point of sale (F.O.B); information 
on size, grade, quantity sold, destination (whether 
domestic or export); and month sold. Data on the 
Producer Price Index (PPI) for inputs used in pear 
production were obtained from the Bureau of La-
bor Statistics. Data on monthly disposable income 
were obtained from the United States Department 
of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis. Ad-
ditional details relating to variable descriptions and 
summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
The dependent variables for the demand and 
supply system are warehouse level free-on-board 
(FOB) prices by size and month for US#1 D’Anjou 
pears, and quantity of boxes per size and month for 60   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
US#1 D’Anjous. The US#1 pear data used comprise 
over 80 percent of the total D’Anjou market. Extra 
Fancy and U.S. #2 pears were not used because of 
their small market share. Up to twelve sizes of pears 
are marketed in any given month, though not all 
sizes are observed each month. There were a total of 
836 data observations spanning 77 months (Septem-
ber 1993 through July 2000, excluding the month of 
August each year in which no commercial market of 
D’Anjou pears exists). On average, there were just 
under eleven sizes observed each month. 
Regarding the empirical speciﬁcation of the 
inverse-supply function (5), we used the following 
speciﬁcation, based on consideration of statistical 
signiﬁcance, economic interpretability, and data 
availability:
(8)  ln(pit) = δs + (τs − 1)ln(qit) + α1SIZEit + α2PPIt
Pear 




where pit denotes the price of U.S. #1 D’Anjous 
by size and month in dollars per carton, qit repre-
sents the quantity of U.S. #1 D’Anjous by size and 
month in cartons, SIZEit is the number of pears per 
42 lb. carton, PPIt
Pear is the producer-prices-paid 
index for pear production, STORt is the monthly 
future value of one dollar given the federal funds 
rate, Ss denotes the collection of statistically sig-
niﬁcant monthly indicator variables, which in fact 
spanned the 9 months inclusive from September 
through May, Dkis a month-indicator variable, and 
εs
it is a residual term (additional details relating to 
the statistical results, including their interpretation 
and statistical signiﬁcance, are provided in the next 
section). Note that in the empirical speciﬁcation of 
supply (8) relative to the conceptual model (5), the 
value of −ln(1 + θit/τd) is being represented season-
ally by the values of αk+3, ∀k∈Ss, and the industry 
Table 1. Variable Descriptions and Summary Statistics.
Variable Description Obs Mean St.dev. Min Max
pit Price of US#1 D’Anjous by size and month, 
in $/carton
836 14 4 4 24
qit Quantity of US#1 D’Anjous by size and 
month, in cartons
836 34586 38369 1 186151
SIZEit Number of pears per 42 lb. carton  12 125 36 50 180
PPIt
Pear Producer-prices-paid index for pear pro-
duction 





Monthly future value of 
$1 = ∏
j∈Ss(1 + rj), where r is the federal 
funds rate in month j and St is the set of 
months in the marketing year from Septem-
ber to month t
77 1.03 0.014 1.003 1.054
QIMPt Imports in 1000-metric-ton units 77 7.7 9.4 0 41.7
Pt
orange Orange prices per carton 77 6.74 2.07 1.81 13.7
Pt
apple Apple price per pound 77 0.20 0.04 0.12 0.30
INCt Disposable income in month t, billions of 
$
77 492 51 413 593
YEAR Crop-year index, where 1993=1, 1994=2, 
…, 1999 =7.
7 4 2.16 1 7
Dk Month indicator = 1 in month k 11 .09 .30 0 1
SINEt Sine((j/6)π), where j is the number of the 
month, cyclically repeating by marketing 
year
11 0 .77 -1 1
COSINEt Cosine((j/6)π), where j is the number of the 
month, cyclically repeating by marketing 
year
11 0 .77 -1 1Winfree, McCluskey, Mittelhammer, and Gutman Seasonal Oligopoly Power in the D'Anjou Pear Industry  61
conduct parameter for month k is then deﬁned by θik 
= argθik{αk+3 = −ln(1 + θit/τd)}.The supply-function 
shifter component of equation (5) is represented 
in equation (8) by all of the regressors other than 
the indicator variables and qit. Recall that August 
is excluded a priori since there is no commercial 
market for D’Anjou pears during that month. 
The ﬁnal empirical speciﬁcation of the demand 
function is 




j + ß5YEARi +
      ß6QIMPt +  ß7Pt
orange +  ß8Pt
apple +  ß9INCt  +
      ß10SINEt + ß10COSINEt + εs
it ,
where YEARi represents the crop year where a 
value of 1 is given in 1993, 2 in 1994, etc.; QIMPt 
is the total quantity of all imported pears given in 
1000 metric ton units; Porange is the price of oranges 
for that month; Papple is the price of apples for that 
month; INCt is the U.S. disposable income for that 
month in billions of dollars; SINEt is the trigono-
metric function that equals SINE(j�/6) where j is 
the number of the month; COSINEt is analogous to 
SINEt; and εs
it is a residual term. We note that the 
trigonometric terms in the speciﬁcation represent 
a seasonal cycle effect that was also found to be 
important in Arnade and Pick’s (2000) analysis 
of aggregate pear demand. We also assume that 
consumers have a different demand for different 
sizes of pears. From these two equations we can 
now estimate oligopoly power by θk = τd(e−αk+3 − 1), 
Because equation (8)–(9) represents a system of 
over-identiﬁed simultaneous equations, a three-
stage least-squares estimation was used to obtain 
estimates of the parameters of the model.
Results
Three-stage least-squares estimates of the supply 
and demand system equation (8)–(9) are presented 
in Table 2. All of the signs of the estimated coef-
ﬁcients are consistent with economic theory, and 
the large majority of the estimated parameters were 
statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level of type I er-
ror or better, based on asymptotically valid Z-statis-
tics and a standard normal asymptotic distribution. 
The R2 statistics indicate that both the supply and 
demand equations ﬁt the historical monthly data 
reasonably well. The estimated monthly price ﬂex-
ibility of supply, (τs − 1), is positive and inﬂexible 
at a value of .044, while the monthly price elasticity 
of demand, τd, is inelastic at a value of –0.72. The 
magnitudes and signs of these parameters ensure 
that a supply-demand equilibrium solution exists. 
Signiﬁcant shifters of the supply price include 
downward shifts due to economies in handling 
larger fruit and positive shifts due to increasing 
costs of production inputs and increasing storage 
costs as the marketing year progresses. Quantity 
demanded is effected by a signiﬁcant seasonal 
component (.992 × SINE + .622 × COSINE) that 
exhibits a monotonically increasing demand effect 
from September until February, followed by a 
monotonically declining demand effect thereafter 
though July, which is the end of the marketing year. 
Demand is also affected by the pear size category, 
where the estimated size effect (a quartic function 
of SIZE) is such that price is a concave function 
of size (the number of pears per 42 pound carton) 
that exhibits a peak in the midsize 90-to-100 size 
category and troughs for the smallest size (180) and 
largest size (50) pears.
The estimated industry conduct parameters in 
Table 3 are measures of the difference between price 
and marginal cost over the marketing year. These 
values can be interpreted as measures of oligopoly 
power, which are outcomes of some generally un-
known game (Karp and Perloff 1993). A joint test 
of the hypothesis that each of the monthly oligopoly 
power values was equal was conducted and resulted 
in a Wald statistic of 55.06, which is signiﬁcant at 
the .01 level. This suggests that the degree of oli-
gopoly power changes during different seasons of 
the year. While the range of monthly conduct pa-
rameter magnitudes corresponding to the Northwest 
D’Anjou market (0.034 to 0.195 ) is roughly similar 
to that found by Arnade and Pick (0.001 to 0.245), 
in their 2000 study of seasonal oligopoly power in 
the aggregate U.S. pear industry (applicable to 1976-
1993), the seasonal pattern of the estimated conduct 
parameters is notably different. In particular, we ﬁnd 
that oligopoly power is most pronounced when the 
fresh D’Anjou pear crop ﬁrst becomes available to 
the market in the earliest months of the marketing 
year (September and October); this power then 
wanes steadily, becoming low-to-none in the latter 
part of the marketing year (March to July). This is 
in contrast to Arnade and Pick’s ﬁnding that oli-
gopoly power for the pear industry as a whole was 
strongest in the late spring and summer months, but 
very small otherwise. 62   July 2004 Journal of Food Distribution Research 35(2)
Table 2. 3SLS Estimation Results for Equation System.
Parameter   Parameter Estimate   t-statistics
δs   -4.734**   -3.72
τs   1.044**  13.76
α1 (Size)   -0.398**   -25.78
α2 (PPI)   1.001**  26.43
α3 (STOR)   6.139**   5.00
September   0.314**   5.72
October   0.235**   4.76
November   0.156**   3.48
December   0.133**   3.29
January   0.104**   2.90
February   0.082**   2.61
March   0.066*   2.34
April   0.048   1.93
May   0.056*   2.46
δd   -48.769**   -15.07
τd   -0.724**   -2.91
β1 (SIZE)   198.999**  19.71
β2 (SIZE2)  -247.057**   -17.00
β3(SIZE3)   132.373**  14.94
β4(SIZE4)   -26.530**   -13.67
β5 (YEAR)   -0.182   -1.48
β6 (IMP)   -0.007   -1.42
β7()   0.106**   5.66
β8()   1.129   1.07
β9(INC)   0.007   1.44
β10(SINE)   0.992**  11.40
β11(COSINE)   0.622**  10.96
R2 - Supply   .70
R2 - Demand   .78
* signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
** signiﬁcant at the .01 level.
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Possible reasons for our ﬁnding that oligopoly 
power declines in the early spring and summer 
months relate to the fact that the 1990s exhibited 
substantial growth of imported pears in the U.S. 
domestic market during the latter portion of the 
marketing year, representing a new source of com-
petition that had not been nearly as commercially 
signiﬁcant in prior years. In addition, because the 
current analysis corresponds to a speciﬁc variety 
of pears, it might be expected that oligopoly power 
would diminish during the marketing year as these 
pears, in refrigerated or controlled-atmosphere stor-
age for extended periods of time, decline in quality, 
and moreover need to be sold or else discarded as 
the marketing year comes to a close. This latter 
consideration need not be a factor in an aggregated-
type of analysis such as Arnade and Pick’s, where 
several varieties of pears with differing marketing 
years and storage cycles are being considered.
Powers (1992) utilized the price differential 
between fresh oranges and processing oranges to 
measure the extent to which the marketing order for 
California-Arizona navel oranges was successful in 
exercising oligopoly power in allocating oranges 
between fresh and processed use. He ﬁrst obtained 
estimates of the demands in the fresh and processed 
markets and then expressed fresh versus processed 
market-price differential as the solution to a proﬁt-
maximization problem. His results for 1965-89 data 
indicated modest but signiﬁcant monopoly power, 
with point estimates of θ ranging from 0.18 to 0.44. 
Oligopoly power was found to decrease after 1983, 
when the U.S. Department of Agriculture imple-
mented rules that limited the number of weeks that 
allocation restrictions were in effect.
Perfect collusion, or monopoly power, was 
rejected for each month at any reasonable level. 
Our estimated price distortions (i.e., the industry 
price mark-up over marginal cost) during the 
period under study are represented by values of 
|θit/τd| × 100, which were estimated to be as high 
as 27 percent during the marketing year. This can 
be compared with other industries in which price 
mark-ups over marginal cost were examined. For 
example, Schroeter (1988) found that estimated 
price distortions for the beef-packing industry from 
1951 through 1983 were between 2.7 percent and 
8 percent. He concluded from this that there was 
little price distortion in the beef-packing industry. 
As a point of comparison, the estimated levels of 
price distortion exercised by a cartel of railroads 
controlling shipments from Chicago to the Atlan-
tic seaboard during the late nineteenth century was 
estimated to be 43 percent (Porter 1983), implying 
a great deal of price distortion and possibly even 
collusive behavior. Overall, the estimated level of 
price distortion for the pear industry seems rela-
tively high and suggests some degree of oligopoly 
power in the industry, consistent with an oligopo-
listic market structure, at least during the early part 
of the marketing year. 
Conclusions
A simultaneous system of supply and demand equa-
tions was estimated to recover industry conduct pa-
Table 3. Oligopoly Power Values.










* signiﬁcant at the .05 level.
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rameters monthly and over time for the Northwest 
D’Anjou pear industry. It was found that the North-
west D’Anjou pear industry has had some degree of 
oligopoly power when the new crop ﬁrst enters the 
market and when ﬂows of shipments from imports 
and/or other pear varieties are low. The empirical 
ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis stated 
at the outset of the paper. A notable degree of price 
distortion is found to prevail in the fall of each year, 
consistent with an oligopolistic market structure, but 
then wanes as the marketing year progresses and is 
small especially following the increase in imported 
pear quantities from Latin America. 
The recent trend of consolidation in the food-
supply chain has implications for the pear industry. 
Large packers in the pear industry should do well 
in a new food-supply chain with increased verti-
cal coordination with retailers; however, smaller 
growers may suffer. The Northwest D’Anjou pear 
industry appears to possess some degree of oli-
gopoly power at certain times of the year and thus 
may have been able to maintain positive economic 
proﬁts by increasing prices above marginal cost at 
times. However, as global competition increases 
due to recent free-trade initiatives and production 
increases in Chile and Argentina, there is an indica-
tion that oligopoly power may diminish. 
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Figure 1. Average U.S. Pear Shipments by Month, in 1000 metric tons, 1993-1994.  